Decentralizing Egypt: Not Just Another Economic Reform by Martinez-Vazquez, Jorge & Timofeev, Andrey
Georgia State University
ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University
Economics Faculty Publications Department of Economics
2011
Decentralizing Egypt: Not Just Another Economic
Reform
Jorge Martinez-Vazquez
Georgia State University, jorgemartinez@gsu.edu
Andrey Timofeev
Georgia State University, atimofeev@gsu.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.gsu.edu/econ_facpub
Part of the Economics Commons
This Book Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Economics at ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Economics Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more
information, please contact scholarworks@gsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jorge Martinez-Vazquez and Andrey Timofeev. Decentralizing Egypt: Not Just Another Economic Reform in Jorge Martinez-Vazquez
and Francois Vaillancourt (eds.) Decentralization in Developing Countries: Global Perspectives on the Obstacles to Fiscal Devolution,
389-430. Edward Elgar Publishing, 2011.
Decentralization in 
Developing Countries
Global Perspectives on the 
Obstacles to Fiscal Devolution
Edited by 
Jorge Martinez-Vazquez
Andrew Young School o f Policy Studies,
Georgia State University, Atlanta, USA
Francois Vaillancourt
Department o f  Economics,
Universite de Montreal, Montreal, Canada
STUDIES IN FISCAL FEDERALISM AND STA TE-LO CA L FINANCE
Edward Elgar
Cheltenham, UK • Northampton, MA, USA
© Jorge Martinez-Vazquez and Francois Vaillancourt 2011
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a 
retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical 
or photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of the 
publisher.
Published by
Edward Elgar Publishing Limited
The Lypiatts
15 Lansdown Road
Cheltenham
Glos GL50 2JA
UK
Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc.
William Pratt House 
9 Dewey Court 
Northampton 
Massachusetts 01060 
USA
A catalogue record for this book 
is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Control Number: 2010929044
FSC* C018575
ISBN 978 1 84980 508 7
Printed and bound by MPG Books Group, UK
12. Decentralizing Egypt: Not Just 
Another Economic Reform
Jorge Martinez-Vazquez and Andrey Timofeev
INTRODUCTION
Egypt is a unitary country with one o f  the longest centralized traditions in 
the world reaching back several millennia to the tim es o f the pharaohs. 
Later, local councils (Diwans) set up by the French in 1798 were not elected 
and played a purely consultative/advisory role. In m odem  Egypt, the regim e 
introduced through the revolution o f  1952 by Nasser has remained quite 
attached to a centralized form o f governm ent with several manifestations o f 
territorial deconcentration largely based on the Soviet budgeting m odel.1 
Although, as discussed below, there has been considerable econom ic 
progress and modernization o f market institutions in recent times, Egypt's 
public sector remains bloated and inefficient, and basically unable to 
improve the quality o f  basic services such as health and education for its 
citizens.2 This has had adverse impacts on the standard o f  living o f  citizens 
and on the ability to put the country on a sustainable path o f  economic 
growth. These failings have also had an impact on the popularity and 
acceptance o f  the current political regime. Although formally Egypt is a 
parliam entary dem ocratic system, de facto, the National Democratic Party 
(NDP) has ruled the country as a single-party regim e under strong 
presidential rule. The failings o f the current system o f  governance vis-a-vis 
the delivery o f  public services has caused the current government to become 
interested in finding, or at least exploring the possibility of, a solution in 
some form o f decentralization reform. But a successful decentralization 
effort will require the political empowerment o f local communities and this 
is a step that some in the current regim e are unsure can be taken, while at 
the same tim e there are others that feel that this is a step that the regime 
cannot afford not to take. Changing the political landscape and status quo 
from the bottom up is the most significant obstacle on the horizon for 
genuine decentralization reform in Egypt.
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JUST ANOTHER ECONOMIC REFORM? THE POLITICS 
OF DECENTRALIZATION
Egypt has a good record on several successful reform programs aiming at 
resolving significant economic crises in the last couple of decades. After the 
unraveling o f  the econom ic boom o f  the 1970s, at the start o f  the 1990s 
Egypt found itself with a budget deficit over 15 percent o f  GDP, inflation 
over 20 percent, and accum ulation o f  arrears on external debt service. The 
stabilization effort included fiscal adjustment, anchoring exchange rate vis- 
a-vis US dollar, and liberalization o f  credit and exchange markets. As 
indicated in Figure 12.1, the reform s were successful in curbing inflation by 
1996, prompting econom ic growth and planting the seeds for the eventual 
take-off o f  the financial market.
The growth spurt that started in 1993 had run out o f  steam  by 2001, 
prompting another round o f  reform s. Egypt’s econom y has undergone a 
remarkable makeover as result o f the ambitious reform agenda pushed 
through by Prim e M inister N azif within a year after he took office in July
2004. The reforms included lowering the overall tax burden in place o f  
individualized tax breaks, sim plifying licensing and tax compliance 
procedures for both individual and corporate taxpayers, including the 
creation o f  one-stop shops for investors in major urban centers.3 Other 
reform measures included anti-trust legislation and di vesture o f  government 
stakes in banks and enterprises. Figure 12.1 shows dramatic improvement in 
all macroeconomic indicators after 2004, which was particularly explosive 
for foreign direct investments and financial market capitalization.
However, am idst all those econom ic successes, the country has been 
moving much more slowly in the area o f  public service delivery. For 
example, while Egypt has achieved a dramatic improvement in literacy rates 
from under 50 percent in 1986 to more than 70 percent in 2005, it still ranks 
125 out o f  164 countries (W DI, 2007). The lack o f transparency and 
com prehensive strategy in the provision o f  healthcare results in local 
residents seeking private alternatives, which often involve the sam e doctors 
as in the public clinics and is often provided on the same public premises. 
As a result more than half o f healthcare financing comes out o f  patients’ 
pockets (W orld Bank, 2006a).4
O ne o f  the most telling indications that local affairs have been 
m ismanaged under the present system is the inefficient urban growth in 
term s o f  the use o f  the scarce arable land. The share o f rural population has 
remained at about 60 percent since the 1960s. However, both rural and 
urban population more than doubled since the 1960s. Furtherm ore, both 
urban and rural populations huddle on a strip o f  arable land along the river 
Nile. The national goal o f  land reclam ation, including building new urban
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Figure 12.1 Evolution o f  Macro-economic Indicators
Source: Prepared by authors using data reported in WDI (2007).
Notes: Inflation and GDP growth should be read off the primary vertical axis; FD1 
and stock market capitalization should be read off the secondary vertical axis.
settlements, has had limited success. Besides concentrating in arable lands, 
urban growth rem ains largely uncontrolled, taking out o f  agricultural use 
m ore land than is necessary. It is estimated that by 2025 half o f  Egypt’s 
arable land will be lost to informal settlements (HDR, 2004). The rate o f 
illegal construction has exceeded that for authorized development. For 
example, over 1976-1996 the Cairo population in squatter settlements grew 
at an annual rate o f  8 percent com pared to 4 percent growth in planned areas 
o f  the city (HDR, 2005).
It is within this broad framework o f  economic modernization reaching 
out to the subnational government units that decentralization reform has 
been pitched by reform ers within E gypt's political establishment inside the 
NDP and Government. The statement o f  the cabinet delivered to the 
People’s Assem bly in a session held on December 19, 2004 by Prime 
M inister Ahmad N azeef em phasized “deepening decentralization and 
enhancing com m unity partnership, through expanding in transferring the 
com petences o f  the departments and ministries to the governorates, and 
boosting the powers o f  the governors in adm inistrating the utilities and 
appointing the senior officials, with giving the governorates more flexibility 
in deciding its development requirem ent, and participating in preparing 
public budget o f  the state, and delegating them in managing expenses o f
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certain items o f  the budgets, which are linked to operation, maintenance and 
services.”
He called for activating the role o f  the local popular councils in control 
Junctions, to reach some balance between the local executives and local 
elected councils, giving the latter a bigger part in preparing plans and 
monitoring their implementation. President Mubarak endorsed the principle 
o f  “Decentralization for Democracy” in the Presidential M anifesto o f 2005 
and reiterated calls for deep decentralization reforms in his recent 
speeches.5 Decentralization was also part o f  the NDP platform  for the 
parliamentary elections o f  2005, and at its 9lh annual conference in 
November 2007, the NDP unveiled in a working paper its decentralization 
vision.6
A critical difficulty with decentralization reform in Egypt is that it is 
becoming increasingly understood that this will not be ju s t another 
economic reform that can be implemented by the G overnm ent within the 
existing political institutions. Decentralization reform will require different 
degrees o f  dem ocratization and political opening which may facilitate the 
em powerm ent o f  the political opposition to  the current regime.
The main political risk o f  decentralization for the Governm ent and the 
establishm ent within the NDP is the fear o f  providing a platform  for the 
Muslim Brotherhood, an Islamic movem ent with deep roots in Egypt’s 
society. W hile technically outlawed, the Muslim Brotherhood has been the 
main threat to Egypt’s secularism and to the present political regim e for 
many decades. These fears associated with political decentralization are not 
unfounded. Since its inception in 1928 the Muslim Brotherhood has been 
active at the grass-root level and fairly popular with the poor for its social 
work helping citizens obtain food, jobs, and healthcare and other areas 
where official government institutions have continued to fail to  deliver. In 
particular, the Muslim Brotherhood has a successful history o f  taking over 
defunct public institutions and turning them into well-functioning bodies 
and later using them as a platform for prom oting its cause. Thus in the 
1980s, M uslim Brotherhood activists contested elections for many 
professional syndicates that had been marred by “a lack o f  transparency, no 
clear decision-m aking processes, political infighting, corruption and 
financial mismanagement.” (Zahid and Medley, 2006 p. 704). Benefiting 
from the discontent o f  the syndicates’ m embership, Muslim Brotherhood 
activists were able to  win election to the boards o f  such respected syndicates 
as engineers, pharmacists, and lawyers. Their past experience o f  
management and adm inistration o f resources gained through their grass-root 
work allowed the M uslim Brotherhood to successfully halt m ajor abuses at 
the syndicates and turn them into functioning bodies o f civic organization.
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This prompted the government to issues Law 100 o f  1993 effectively 
nationalizing the syndicates.
O ther more recent events point toward the perception o f  a threat from 
the Muslim Brotherhood. For example, allegedly an internationally 
sponsored project for em powering school councils was suspended because 
o f  suspected M uslim Brotherhood infiltration (Springborg, 2007). In the 
2005 national legislative elections, running as independents, the Muslim 
Brotherhood won 88 out o f  444 seats com pared to just 14 seats won by all 
officially-sanctioned opposition parties together. Politicization o f  local 
government increased with the am endm ents to article 76 o f  the 
Constitution, approved in a May 2005 referendum, requiring independent 
presidential candidates to obtain at least 140 signatures from members o f 
local councils in at least 14 govem orates in order to  have their name on the 
ballot. Local council elections w ere initially scheduled for April 2006, but 
the governm ent postponed them following the strong showing o f Muslim 
Brotherhood-affiliated candidates in the national legislative elections in late
2005. When the local elections were finally held in April 2008, the Muslim 
Brotherhood undertook trem endous effort to get on the ballot but they 
encountered unprecedented difficulties in having their people registered as 
candidates and ended up boycotting elections resulting in the lowest voter 
turnover ever (less than 5 percent according to Herzallah and Hamzawy, 
2008).
Another political constraint for decentralization is the unwritten policy 
o f  zero retrenchm ent o f public employment. In the past, many reform 
initiatives have failed to overcome this hurdle, including the performance 
budgeting introduced in the Planning Law (No. 70 o f 1973) and Budgeting 
Law (No. 53 o f  1973). The common belief is that the only politically 
feasible solution to the bloated public sector is to allow natural attrition as 
the private em ploym ent continues growing. However, given the self­
selection o f  those staying in the public sector, the ultimate goal o f 
decentralization to improve local services might be hard to achieve with the 
available workforce.
Although the political risks associated with the third rail o f  public 
em ploym ent and the partial capture o f  decentralized governments by the 
M uslim Brotherhood appear to be quite real, the dilemma for government 
authorities is whether doing nothing and continuing to go with the status 
quo is not as politically risky in the medium term. But, before getting into 
the discussion o f  what form o f  decentralization m ay be both effective and 
politically feasible, in the next sections we take stock o f  what the current 
system o f  subnational governments is like and what will be needed for 
change.
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A Strongly Hierarchical Vertical Structure of Government
The vertical structure o f Egypt’s governm ent is com posed o f  29 
governorates (27 before 2008) at the first subnational level, about 300 
districts (markazes in rural governorates and kisms in urban governorates) at 
the second subnational level, over 200 cities (medinas) and 1,100 Villages 
(quriyat) at the third subnational level. In addition there are over four 
thousand unincorporated settlem ents without a council. With an average 
population size o f  about 200,000, the district level jurisdictions appear to be 
big enough to provide public services where there exist economies o f  scale, 
such as water treatment plants and hospital services. W ith their average 
population size over 35,000, cities, and to  a lesser extent villages, appear to 
be also well positioned to provide most other local services in a manner that 
is most responsive to local needs; however, there are significant deficiencies 
in administration capacity at this level, at least in villages.
As shown in Table 12.1, there are significant disparities between the 
four groups o f  governorates: Urban Governorates, Lower Egypt, Upper 
Egypt, and Frontier G overnorates (see the m ap in Figure 12.2). Urban 
governorates are the four largest cities— Alexandria, Cairo, Port Said and 
Suez— accounting for 20 percent o f  Egypt’s population. They all have 
socio-econom ic indicators above the national average. Lower Egypt 
governorates represent over forty percent o f the national population, located 
in the fertile Nile Delta, in the most Northern part o f  the country. These are 
predom inantly rural areas with socio-econom ic indicators around the 
national average. Upper Egypt governorates cover just over one-third o f the 
national population, located south o f  Cairo. These are predom inantly rural 
areas with most unfavorable socio-econom ic indicators. Finally, Frontier 
Governorates cover only 2 percent o f  the national population (but 70 
percent o f  land area) located in Sinai and the deserts that lie west and east o f 
the Nile. These are highly urbanized governorates with above average 
socio-econom ic indicators and the lowest poverty rate in the country. 
However, because o f  their rem ote location, some areas in the Frontier 
G overnorates lack infrastructure such as access to electricity.
The current hierarchical vertical structure o f  government is largely based 
on the 1971 Constitution and Law 43 o f  1979. It should be noted that the 
area o f  subnational government has experienced a lot o f  adm inistrative and 
legislative changes over the last several decades. Thus, since 1960 nine laws 
have been issued7 and the national agency responsible for local government 
has changed its nam e and organizational form num erous times. However 
the substantive changes that have occurred, if  anything, resulted in a weaker 
status for the subnational governments. The most symbolic manifestation o f 
that was the change o f  the nam e o f  Law 43 itself from the initial “On Local 
Governm ent” to “On Local A dm inistration” as o f  the 1988 am endment.
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Figure 12.2 Groups o f  Governorates 
Source: Prepared by authors.
Once elected, local executive heads— Omdas in the sub-village level 
ham lets— are appointed by the M inister o f  Interior since 1994. Moreover, in 
1988, local councilors lost the power to  hold the executives accountable 
through the so-called interpellation procedure. Furthermore, there is 
universal opinion that the practice o f  local administration is far from what is 
outlined in the current law. As was observed in one study almost two 
decades ago (M oharram 1992):
Irrespective o f  what the law provides, most processes involve 
to a great extent informal, personal interactions. These 
personal relations are fa r  more important in determining what 
is achieved, and what is not achieved than the prescribed 
form al linkages between the different levels o f  the 
bureaucracy. This aspect o f  informality to a greater extent 
introduces random, subjective, and often arbitrary elements 
into the decision-making process o f  the local government.
Some believe that Sadat got ahead o f  him self declaring a new policy for 
“dem ocratization and local governance” in the 1970s envisioning elected 
local governm ents and appointed governors serving only as representatives 
o f  the center (Sawi, 2002). The subsequent backtracking might be explained 
by the fact that, according to the language o f the 1971 Constitution and 
entrenched political culture, all local administration structures are the arms 
o f  the central government. The departure o f  actual practice from the system 
o f  local government outlined in the current law makes it difficult to have a
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Table 12.1 Regional Social, Economic and Demographic Conditions
Descriptive Statistics Urbanizatio
Rate
Pop.
Density, GDP Poverty Sewerage Piped water Electricity
persons per 
1000 sq km
EGP per 
capita % share of households with services
URBAN GOVERNORA TES
Average 0.98 10.96 10,950 7.73 0.90 0.98 0.99
Minimum 0.94 0.06 10,156 4.30 0.89 0.94 0.97
Maximum 1.00 40.89 13,419 8.80 0.92 1.00 1.00
LOWER EGYPT
Average 0.30 1.46 5,598 12.59 0.58 0.97 0.99
Minimum 0.19 0.19 4,638 4.40 0.25 0.92 0.99
Maximum 0.45 3.95 6,933 28.80 0.86 1.00 1.00
UPPER EGYPT
Average 0.32 2.16 4,417 32.30 0.28 0.85 0.99
Minimum 0.19 1.18 3,337 12.50 0.12 0.00 0.99
Maximum 0.64 5.27 6,825 61.00 0.70 1.00 0.99
FRONTIER GOVERNORATES
Average 0.65 0.90 8,401 5.40 0.47 0.86 0.91
Minimum 0.48 0.01 6,296 - 0.24 0.76 0.87
Maximum 0.96 4.05 12,819 - 0.69 0.99 0.99
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Table 12.1 Regional Social, Economic and Demographic Conditions (continued)
Descriptive Statistics UrbanizatioRate
Pop.
Density, GDP
Poverty Sewerage Piped water Electricity
persons per 
1000 sq km
EGP per 
capita %
share of households with services
ALL GOVERNORATES
Average 0.47 3.00 6,516 19.77 0.61 0.91 0.97
Minimum 0.19 0.01 3,337 4.30 0.24 0.00 0.87
Maximum 1.00 40.89 13,419 61.00 0.92 1.00 1.00
Correlation Matrix
Urban. Rate 1.00 0.33 0.81 -0.49 0.58 -0.13 -0.27
Pop. Density 0.33 1.00 0.31 -0.21 0.29 0.01 0.14
GDP per capita 0.81 0.31 1.00 -0.59 0.69 -0.08 -0.37
Poverty -0.49 -0.21 -0.59 1.00 -0.80 0.00 -0.37
Sewerage 0.58 0.29 0.69 -0.80 1.00 -0.04 0.15
Piped water -0.13 0.01 -0.08 0.00 -0.04 1.00 0.22
Electricity -0.27 0.14 -0.37 -0.37 0.15 0.22 1.00
Source: Computed by authors based on the 2006 Census Data.
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clear picture o f  Egypt’s local governm ent not only for foreign scholars but 
for the Government o f  Egypt itself, which appears many tim es to be 
navigating its journey tow ards decentralization by way o f  “touch and feel.”
Currently, at each subnational level, there is an elected representative 
organ (Local Popular Council or LPC) and the centrally appointed executive 
branch. The local executives are made up o f  the local head’s secretariat 
(Diwan) and deconcentrated offices (called ‘service directorates’) o f  
twelve central government ministries or agencies, sometimes reaching two 
or more subnational levels. Three central agencies have directorates at the 
governorate level only: Transportations and Roads, Property Taxation, 
Organization and Administration. With the exception o f  property taxation, 
these functions involve spillover o f  benefits across district borders and 
economies o f  scale. Four agencies have directorates at the governorate level 
and departments at the district level: Veterinary, Trade, Labor, Youth and 
Sports. Four agencies are represented at all three levels (governorate, 
district, and village): Education, Health, Agriculture and Housing. Finally, 
one agency, Social Affairs, has offices at the governorate and village level 
but not at the district level.
The service directors form a management group called the Local 
Executive Council (LEC), which replaced previous Soviet-style “executive 
com m ittees.” The LEC is formally chaired by the appointed executive head: 
governorate LECs form ally chaired by governors appointed by the 
President, city LECs formally chaired by mayors appointed by the Prime 
M inister, district LECs formally chaired by district heads appointed by the 
governors and so on. However, reportedly there is a lack o f  a legal basis for 
horizontal coordination within the executive branch and often there is more 
accountability o f  service directors along the sectoral hierarchy than to the 
governor/mayor. Essentially the local executive head (Governor/M ayor) has 
substantial authority over the finances and personnel only o f  his own 
secretariat (Diwan), which is sim ilar to the powers o f  the service directors 
over the finances and personnel in their respective sectors.
In addition to service directorates, public holding com panies for public 
utilities, such as water supply and wastewater treatment, have operating 
com panies at governorate levels but there is no direct oversight o f  the 
operating com panies by governors or governorate LPCs.
The local adm inistration system is hierarchical am ong local units or 
between local units and the central government. In other words, the LPCs at 
higher levels have the right to  supervise and m onitor the lower level LPCs. 
They also have the right to approve or object to decisions taken at lower 
levels. Sim ilar hierarchical supervision is exercised by the executive heads 
in their hierarchical relations with each other and with the central 
government.
The LPCs have only the right to ask questions or request information 
from the head and members o f LECs, but they do not have the right to 
interrogate the LECs and thus cannot remove them from office or even 
recom m end that to  the central government. By contrast, the heads o f  local 
units have the right to  object to  the decisions o f  the LPCs if  there is 
violation o f  the plan, approved budget, laws or regulations.8 In this case, the 
governor or the mayor m ay return the decision to the council, which issued 
it, accom panied by his comments and the basis o f  objection within 15 days 
from the date the decision was issued. I f  the govem orate LPC insists on its 
decision, the issue is referred to the Prime Minister. If  the decision objected 
to is issued by the LPC at the sub-govem orate level, the issue is referred to 
the M inister o f  Local Development after the head o f  the govem orate LPC is 
inform ed by the governor. The objected decision must be settled, at least in 
theory, within 30 days from the date it was presented to the Prime M inister 
or the M inister o f Local Development. Their decision will be final.
Legislation on local administration requires election o f  ten councilors 
from each constituent unit resulting in an unmanageably large size o f  the 
elected council. Thus Cairo, divided into 36 districts, has a council o f  360 
members. Currently LPCs are dominated by governm ent employees. This is 
likely to create a conflict o f  interest because supervision o f  the executive 
branch by local councilors would essentially mean supervising their own 
employers (Springborg, 2007).
Several important features o f  the Egyptian budgeting process bear a 
close resemblance to the Soviet “m atroshka” model in which some 
subnational budgets are nested into larger ones in a relationship o f vertical 
fiscal dependency allowing for different degrees o f  fiscal discretion. This 
discrepancy is due to  that fact that the higher-level government only 
controls budgetary appropriations aggregated for all units at the level 
im m ediately below. For example, for each govem orate the national 
governm ent approves appropriations by item for the com posite o f the 
govem orate governm ent itself and the sum o f all districts in that 
govem orate. Similarly, when it comes to budget reporting, the national 
governm ent receives information on the sum o f the govem orate and district 
spending. This clearly allows govem orate authorities one important 
dimension o f  discretion; for example, if  the governor decides not to  pass on 
any part o f the petrol appropriations to the district level instead spending it 
entirely on the govem orate headquarters car fleet, the M inistry o f  Finance 
would not know it from the reported budget allocations. In addition, the 
G overnor (or govem orate service director) has substantial discretion in 
allocating funds am ong administrative units at the level immediately below.
The hierarchical/dual subordination takes on different configurations 
with respect to  different government decisions. For exam ple, during budget
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planning, budget requests from service directorates are consolidated at the 
governorate level, and after formal approval by the governorate LPC, sent 
to or negotiated with the M inistry o f  Finance. Thus line ministries are at 
best informed about budget requests from their deconcentrated directorates 
but are not actively involved in budget negotiations. The only input o f the 
line ministries to budgeting by their deconcentrated units are norm s such as 
teacher-pupil ratios and number o f textbooks (W orld Bank, 2005b).
When it comes to budget execution, disbursements are m ade directly to 
the accounts o f  service directorates and the Governor has no formal 
authority over sectoral funds but only over the funds o f his own secretariat. 
However, the Governor does have to  sign o ff  on the service directors’ 
requests to reallocate their resources within the narrow budget categories 
before these requests can be subm itted to the M inistry o f  Finance. Even the 
formal budget holders (i.e. service directors and the executive heads) while 
enjoying some discretion in allocating funds am ong lower-level units have 
little flexibility in shifting funds am ong budget categories once the budget is 
approved. Shifting o f  funds am ong economic categories, for example from 
wages to material supplies, requires parliam entary approval. Shifting items 
among main sub-categories, for exam ple from basic wages to  supplemental 
allowances, requires approval o f  the M inistry o f  Finance (or Ministry o f  
Economic Development in the case o f  capital expenditures). Governors and 
local heads can authorize moving resources only within narrower sub­
categories o f  expenditures.
The personnel matters o f  service directorates (appointm ent, promotion, 
transfer) are entirely in the purview o f line ministries with the final approval 
by the Central Agency for Organization and Administration (CAOA). At 
the same time, the wage bill accounts for 93 percent o f  the directorates' 
budgets. Importantly, this budget for labor services is essentially pre­
determined by the number and type o f  posts and their remuneration set by 
the CAOA. By contrast, in the budgets o f  executive heads’ secretariats 
(Diwans), over which the latter have operational control, personnel costs 
account for less than one-third and thus allows m ore flexibility in spending. 
In fact non-wage budget o f  the heads’ secretariats is almost double o f  that 
o f  the twelve service directorates put together. Furthermore, the non-wage 
budget o f  all service directorates is less than the extra-budgetary resources, 
over which governors have essentially full control. Extra-budgetary funds 
can be used for: 1) budget shortages (except wages), 2) service 
improvement (e.g. computerization o f  service directorates), and 3) capital 
projects.
Essentially, extra-budgetary accounts are the only available vehicle for 
exercising meaningful local self-governm ent. For example, villages do not 
have their own budget or a budgetary account -  their expenses are part o f
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the district budget. However, villages can and do establish extra-budgetary 
accounts, which they manage independently; they keep a record o f  all 
account transactions, which they periodically send to the district finance 
department, where they are counted as part o f the district budget report. 
Extra-budgetary resources represent on average less than 5 percent o f  the 
total local spending but almost a quarter o f  non-wage expenditures.
DECONCENTRATED EXPENDITURE 
RESPONSIBILITIES WITH LOW DISCRETION
The assignment o f  expenditure responsibilities at different levels o f 
governm ents is, for the most part, unclear. The closest resem blance to a 
formal assignment o f  expenditure responsibilities can be found in Law 43 of 
1979 on Local Administration. However, the references to specific 
functions are scattered all over the text o f  this law. For example. Article 25 
establishes responsibility o f  governors for food security, efficiency of 
agricultural and industrial production, security, morals, and public values. 
For districts and towns, other than internal management, the Law only 
mentions “establishing various services for the benefit o f  local populations” 
and regulating public utilities. Village Executive Councils are entrusted 
with collecting revenues and surveying public dem and for services and 
projects. In a num ber o f  occasions, the legislation assigns the same function 
to  several levels o f  government. Thus, for example, it stipulates that local 
authorities “take charge o f establishing and adm inistering all public services 
in their territory” (Article 2). However, for example, collecting solid waste 
in a given neighborhood takes place in the territory o f  a certain town quarter 
council, town council, district council, and govem orate council. Then, 
which o f  the four authorities is in charge? Saying that all the four are 
responsible may sim ply imply that nobody is responsible in particular. 
However, overlapping responsibilities is one o f the main features o f  the 
“m atroshka” model. Given the vagueness o f  the law, it is impossible to map 
formal expenditure assignment by level o f  government. One could establish 
the actual assignment by looking at the actual expenditures by level of 
government. However, given the current form o f budget reporting, it is 
impossible to disaggregate subnational expenditures into the govem orate 
and sub-governorate parts due to nesting o f  budgets. We have to  lim it our 
assessm ent to the division o f  expenditures into the national and subnational 
parts.
In practice, the ongoing assignment o f  expenditure responsibilities gets 
reflected in a changing picture o f  public sector expenditures. As shown in 
Figure 12.3, E gypt's public sector has been declining as percent o f  GDP—
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Figure 12.3 Evolution o f  Egypt’s Budgetary Expenditures, % o f  GDP 
Notes: Prepared by authors based on the IMF’s GFS data.
with a short break in 2001—  since the stabilization effort o f  the early 1990s. 
Thus, relative to GDP, total public expenditures dropped from over 35 
percent in 1992 to 30 percent in 2006. The reduction occurred in all sectors 
except for the cases o f  public order and healthcare, both o f  which 
experienced marginal increases. However, one sector, social protection, has 
had an explosive growth from less than 1 percent o f  GDP in 2001 to more 
than 9 percent in 2006. M ore than 99 percent o f these expenses are 
subsidies, mostly for fuel and food. Expenditures other than those on social 
protection dropped from over 26 percent in 2001 to 21 percent in 2006.
Deconcentrated expenditures (those flowing through Diwans and service 
directorates) account for about 5 percent o f  GDP (Table 12.2). Moreover, 
the bulk (80 percent) o f  it is accounted for by just two functions: general 
public adm inistration and education, and most o f  these expenditures are for 
wages and salaries. N ote that for the local heads’ secretariats (Diwans, 
classified as general public adm inistration), the total budgeted amount 
is about 25 percent less than the actual expenditures in the previous 
years (Table 12.2). The reason is that budget plans do not fully account for 
projects financed through extra-budgetary accounts while the final budget 
reports do incorporate those expenditures as they occur. This is not 
observed for other deconcentrated budget holders because m ost user fees 
and other project revenues are channeled to the extra-budgetary accounts
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Table 12.2 Deconcentrated Budgetary Expenditures, % o f  GDP
Actual Actual Actual Budgeted Budgeted
2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07
General Public Services 1.44 1.62 2.00 1.29 1.26
Defense 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0
Public Order And Safety 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0
Economic Affairs 0.36 0.33 0.32 0.32 0.32
Environmental
Protection 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0 0 .0 0
Housing and Community 
Amenities 0.06 0.05 0.05
0.04 0.04
Health 0.64 0.67 0.67 0.49 0.49
Recreation, Culture, and 
Religion 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
Education 2.64 2.49 2.50 2.34 2.41
Social Protection 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08
Total 5.33 5.32 5.71 4.64 4.67
Source: Computed by authors based on National Budget data from FY 06/07.
controlled by the executive heads as opposed to service directors. 
Notwithstanding the overall reduction o f  the total public sector expenditures 
occurring since 2001, the notable trend in actual expenditures at the the 
subnational level is an increase o f  general public expenditures as a share of 
GDP, growing alm ost 40 percent between 2003 and 2005.
For all deconcentrated offices except Diwans, housing, and social 
protection, expenditures on material supplies and capital expenditures have 
been less decentralized than payroll (Table 12.3). At the same time, 
personnel establishments and remuneration are tightly controlled by the 
Central Agency for Organization and Administration (CAOA). Essentially, 
service directorates act as a post office forwarding paychecks.
W hile for Diwans, the allocations on wages and material supplies are 
roughly equal, for service directorates material supplies are less than one- 
fifth o f  their wage bill in FY 2006/07 (Figure 12.4). Mohamed El Shawi 
(2007) reports that, for the subnational executive heads’ secretariats, 
material costs exceeded payroll by a factor o f 3 in 2004/05 (by a factor o f  2 
in 2003/04), while, for service directorates, material costs amounted to less 
than 8 percent o f  the wage bill in 2004/05 and in 2003/04. Thus the bloated 
s ta ff o f  service directorates is likely to  be quite unproductive without 
adequate material supply. In addition to lacking material supplies, the 
deconcentrated public workforce also appears underpaid. Thus, while 58
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percent o f  the public workforce is located at the subnational level, it 
accounts for only 47 percent o f  the public wage bill as o f  2007 (NDP, 
2007).
More than one-third o f  the budget o f  local executive heads’ secretariats 
is allocated towards capital expenditures. This is due to capital grants from 
the M inistry o f  Econom ic Developm ent (form erly Ministry o f  Planning) 
allocated based on a formula weighing population and HDIs (W orld Bank, 
2005b). Local capital projects are also financed from extra-budgetary funds 
controlled by the executive heads.
For budgetary accounts, local authorities have no powers to  shift funds 
across budget items or to the next fiscal year. Any surplus at the end o f  the 
year has to be returned to the state treasury. By contrast, for extra-budgetary 
funds, local authorities have discretion over how to use the resources and 
are also entitled to keep any surplus at the end o f  the fiscal year.
There are persistent disparities in per capita expenditures among 
governorates. Thus, in per capita term s frontier governorates spend more 
than twice the national average expenditures on general government 
services possibly due to lower population density (Table 12.4). At the same 
time, governorates in Upper and Lower Egypt spend only tw o thirds o f the 
national average in per capita terms.
Similarly for education, governorates in Upper and Lower Egypt have 
less than the average am ount o f  per capita resources w hile frontier 
governorates spend almost tw ice the national average (Table 12.5). At the 
same tim e governorates face very different challenges in the area o f  
education. Thus the Upper Egypt governorates have the lowest drop-out rate 
but the highest share o f children never enrolled in school. Lower Egypt has 
the highest drop-out rate but the share o f  never-enrolled is below the 
national average.
In healthcare, frontier governorates have the best health status and at the 
same tim e four-fold the per-capita healthcare spending and twice the 
national average o f  public hospital capacity per capita (Table 12.6). With 
only 2 percent o f the national population, higher per capita spending does 
not take aw ay too much from other governorates but dem onstrates that 
adequate funding makes a difference in health outcomes. On the other hand, 
Upper Egypt had the worst health outcomes and the lowest public hospital 
capacity.
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Table 12.3 Deconcentrated Share o f Expenditures by Budget Function, % o f Budgeted Amount
Function Staff
Goods
And
Services
Interest Subsidies
Other
current
Capital Total
General Public Services 30 53 0 5 3 50 12
out o f which:
95Executive and Legislative organs 92 99 100 99 18 99
Financial and fiscal affairs 18 6 0 0 0 0 12
R & D General Public Services 100 100 0 100 100 0 100
Defense 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Public Order And Safety 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Economic Affairs 50 4 0 0 1 0 19
out o f which:
General Economic and 54 12 0 0 / 0 14
Commercial Affairs
83 0 71General Labor Affairs 81 58 0 3
Agriculture 78 40 0 4 2 0 71
Veterinary 92 21 0 24 22 0 73
Road Transport 67 4 0 74 2 0 16
Environmental Protection 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
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Table 12.3 Deconcentrated Share o f  Expenditures by Budget Function, % o f  Budgeted Amount (continued)
Function Staff
Goods
And
Services
Interest Subsidies
Other
current
Capital Total
Housing and Community 65 31 0 8 7 0 7
Amenities
out o f which:
Housing Development 97 96 0 96 88 0 85
Health 57 28 0 1 2 0 35
out o f  which:
General Hospitals Services 72 42 1 86 4 0 61
Recreation, Culture, and Religion 8 1 0 17 0 0 6
out o f which:
Sporting Services 91 59 0 42 43 0 62
Education 74 18 0 6 0 0 59
out o f  which:
Pre - University Education 96 28 0 20 71 0 87
Social Protection 84 47 0 0 3 0 1
Total 47 26 0 0 0 14 15
Source: Computed by authors based on National Budget data from FY 06/07.
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Table 12.4 Disparities in per capita Allocations on General Public 
Services, EGP per Capital
Actual
02/03
Actual
03/04
Actual
04/05
Budgeted
05/06
Budgeted
06/07
URBAN GO VERNORA TES
Average 141.10 162.52 198.91 169.32 178.93
Minimum 49.39 50.88 115.79 56.92 57.23
Maximum 304.71 344.68 380.77 392.89 401.24
LOWER EGYPT
Average 84.42 117.24 154.60 118.13 125.87
Minimum 56.71 73.25 99.39 75.17 80.57
Maximum 135.92 205.65 264.57 179.35 189.38
UPPER EGYPT
Average 88.60 119.66 166.18 119.40 128.96
Minimum 41.04 68.74 109.57 60.95 71.83
Maximum 180.00 238.30 358.79 208.41 231.47
FRONTIER GOVERNORATES
Average 369.89 475.77 585.59 401.99 439.74
Minimum 211.12 350.55 362.04 301.59 330.86
Maximum 565.39 638.47 766.36 468.03 505.96
ALL GOVERNORATES
Average 147.08 191.15 244.84 178.71 192.88
Minimum 41.04 50.88 99.39 56.92 57.23
Maximum 565.39 638.47 766.36 468.03 505.96
Source: Computed by authors based on National Budget Data from 06/07
HO
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Table 12.5 Regional Variations in Educational Allocations and Educational Inputs
Region Enrollm ent D ropouts
Never
enrolled
SAC
Budgeted per 
capita
Budgeted per
SAC
Budgeted per 
pupil
%  o f  SAC population % o f
population
EGP EGP EGP
URBAN GO VERNORA TES
Average 94.8% 2.1% 3.1% 21.6% 274 1,269 1,330
Minimum 93.3% 1.1% 1.8% 20.4% 175 828 886
Maximum 97.1% 2.8% 4.6% 23.7% 451 2,128 2,192
LOWER EGYPT
Average 93.5% 2.8% 3.7% 23.5% 259 1,101 1,176
Minimum 90.6% 2.0% 2.1% 22.5% 186 786 868
Maximum 95.1% 4.1% 6.5% 24.8% 391 1,706 1,818
UPPER EGYPT
Average 90.5% 2.0% 7.4% 26.5% 225 855 936
Minimum 85.5% 0.7% 2.9% 23.2% 122 524 568
Maximum 96.4% 3.5% 11.0% 28.1% 350 1,436 1,490
FRONTIER GOVERNORATES
Average 90.8% 2.7% 6.4% 22.2% 471 2,195 2,381
Minimum 82.7% 0.9% 1.9% 12.8% 240 840 1,015
Maximum 97.2% 5.2% 12.1% 28.6% 876 3,567 3,670
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Table 12.5 Regional Variations in Educational Allocations and Educational Inputs (continued)
Region Enrollm ent D ropouts
N ever
enrolled
SAC
Budgeted per 
capita
Budgeted per
SAC
Budgeted per 
pupil
% o f  SAC population
% o f
population
EGP EGP EGP
ALL GOVERNORATES
Average 92.2% 2.4% 5.4% 24.0% 289 1,246 1,342
Minimum 82.7% 0.7% 1.8% 12.8% 122 524 568
Maximum 97.2% 5.2% 12.1% 28.6% 876 3,567 3,670
Source: Computed by authors based on data from 2006 Census and 06/07 National Budget.
Note: SAC school-aged child
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Table 12.6 Regional Variations in Healthcare Allocations and Outcomes
Region
Infant
m ortality
<5
m ortality
M aternal
m ortality
Attended
births
Im m unization
Budgeted 
per capita
MOH
beds
M O H/
Total
beds
per 1000 live births % % EGP
Per 1000 
persons
ratio
URBAN GO VERNORA TES
Average 22.58
1.38 73.75 74.58 99.73 39 16 0.49
Minimum
16.90 0.10 60.00 73.50 99.50 7 11 0.30
Maximum 30.60 3.90 90.00
75.50 99.90 90 22 0.69
LOWER EGYPT
Average 15.84 0.97
65.78 73.21 99.54 34 13 0.67
Minimum 11.50
0.10 46.00 64.70 98.80 8 9 0.54
Maximum 18.70
1.90 80.00 75.50 99.90 82 21 0.91
UPPER EGYPT
Average 27.12 1.52
73.44 71.36 99.62 64 12 0.76
Minimum 15.60
0.20 54.00 56.50 98.80 7 9 0.51
Maximum 39.70
2.70 94.00 75.10 99.90 152 24 0.98
FRONTIER GOVERNORATES
Average 16.52 0.06
46.00 70.16 99.18 412 38 0.88
Minimum 9.60 0.00
0.00 63.50 97.20 65 16 0.76
Maximum
21.50 0.10 89.00 75.20 99.90 823 72 0.94
411
Table 12.6 Regional Variations in Healthcare Allocations and Outcomes (continued)
Region
Infan t < 5  
m ortality  m ortality
M aternal
m ortality
Attended
births
Im m unization Budgeted per capita
MOH
beds
M O H/
Total
beds
per 1000 live births % % EGP
Per 1000
persons
ratio
ALL GO VERNORA TES
20.73 1.04 65.85 72.23 99.53 115 18 0.71Average
9.60 0.00 0.00 56.50 97.20 7 9 0.30
Minimum
Maximum 39.70 3.90 94.00 75.50 99.90 823 72 0.98
Source: Computed by authors based on data from 2006 Census and 06/07 National Budget.
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Figure 12.4 Economic Composition o f  D econcentrated Expenditures, 
B udgeted for FY  2006/07
Source: Prepared by authors based on National Budget data from FY 06/07
LOW REVENUE AUTONOMY
Egypt’s revenue raising effort o f  24.5 percent o f  GDP is close to the 
average for low-m iddle-incom e countries (26.2 percent) and close to the 
world average (26.5 percent) according to WDI (2007). However, more 
than a third o f  that revenue derives from non-tax sources, mostly 
rem ittances from the Egyptian Petroleum Corporation (EGPC) and the Suez 
Canal A uthority (SCA). As o f  2006, tax sources generate about 16 percent 
o f  GDP out o f  which 8 percent o f  GDP was accounted for by direct taxes,
5.6 percent o f  GDP was accounted for by taxes on goods and services and
1.6 percent o f  GDP was accounted for by taxes on international trade (Table 
12.7). This represents a significant development since 1990 when revenues 
from indirect taxes outweighed that o f direct taxes.
With the exception o f  a few own taxes authorized for the large cities, all 
locally-generated revenues come from centrally introduced taxes. Revenue 
sharing with subnational budgets is done both at the point o f  collection and 
through redistribution via the grant pool. Law 43 o f 1979 (Art. 35, as 
amended by Law 50 o f  1981) decrees h a lf  o f  shared revenue— structured 
as a surtax on certain national taxes— be allocated to the govem orate budget 
at the point o f  collection: the surtax on exports and imports, the surtax on 
financial assets, and surtax on income derived from trade and 
manufacturing. The rem aining 50 percent o f  the shared revenues are
100%
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Table 12.7 Evolution o f  E g yp t’s Budgetary Revenue, % o f  GDP
1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
T ota l revenue 19.14 26.95 21.84 20.73 20.67 21.35 20.99 20.59 24.49
Tax revenue
out o f  which
13.19 17.62 14.59 14.32 13.41 13.35 13.84 14.07 15.83
Individual 
income tax
0.48 0.56 1.26 1.17 1.73 1.61 1.68 1.73 1.52
Corporate 
income lax
3.10 4.78 4.13 4.16 3.45 3.38 3.94 4.13 6.30
Taxes on 
property
0.25 0.21 NA NA 0.20 0.19 0.16 0.19 0.20
Taxes on goods 
and services
3.12 4.67 5.91 5.80 5.53 5.54 5.47 5.84 5.62
Customs and  
other import 
duties
3.16 3.60 2.73 2.56 1.90 1.95 1.88 1.42 1.55
G ran ts from
foreign
governm ents
1.45 0.84 0.52 0.43 0.83 0.56 0.83 0.39 0.28
Non-tax
revenue
4.47 8.32 6.73 5.97 6.14 7.21 6.12 5.99 8.27
Source: GFS (2008).
allocated to the common grant pool. According to the law, if  activities o f  a 
business establishm ent concentrate in a govem orate different from where 
the business headquarters are located, then the tax revenues from this 
business is allocated to the former governorate. The rates o f  these surtaxes 
have been unstable and have been established in a large body o f  normative 
acts over time. This makes it difficult to assess the actual degree o f  revenue- 
raising powers o f  subnational governments in Egypt.
Governorate Popular Councils determine sharing with constituent 
localities o f  the following revenue: 25 percent o f  the land tax and surtax; 
taxes on motor vehicles and other means o f transport licensed by the 
governorate.
Law 43 o f  1979 (Art. 51 and 61) decrees revenue from the gam bling and 
entertainment tax and 75 percent o f  the land tax to be allocated to the 
budgets o f  tow ns and villages at the point o f collection. In addition, town 
budgets are to receive revenues from the tax and surtaxes on buildings (with 
the exception o f  national surtaxes); betterment levies in connection with 
public works; taxes on motorized vehicles and other means o f  transport
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licensed by the governorate; and revenue from fees out o f  the list o f  11 fees 
that town councils are authorized to levy. Town council resolutions 
concerning levies do not take effect until approved by the district popular 
council and the governor (Art. 53). I f  the town council refuses to make 
changes proposed by the governor, the m atter is referred to the governorate 
popular council, and if  not resolved then to the Cabinet, whose decision is 
final. Concession for public utilities/services and extraction o f  natural 
resources (except oil and mineral resources) can be given only with the 
approval o f  the respective popular council, that is governorate LPC, district 
LPC, and so on (Art. 129). The Law refers to  executive regulations for the 
assessment o f  local taxes and the appeal procedure (Art 125). It allows the 
executive regulations to provide a menu o f  m ethods for the local popular 
council to  choose from. The collection o f  local taxes and tax arrears is 
subject to  the same rules as for national taxes and duties. Local taxes are 
collected by the M inistry o f  Finance to the national treasury and then 
allocated to the local governm ent unit entitled to this revenue.
Law 43 o f  1979 (Art. 36-37) allows creation o f  extra-budgetary funds 
(also known as Special Developm ent Funds) for land reclamation and 
affordable housing. In addition, the Law allows G overnorates’ Popular 
Councils to establish “Account for Services and Local Development,” 
accum ulating user fees, returns on investm ents o f  the account funds, 
donations, and 50 percent o f  own-sources revenue in excess o f  the budget 
estimate. The extra-budgetary accounts are governed by the G overnor’s 
decree and managed by a board chaired by the Governor. Similarly each 
district and village is to establish the “Account for Services and Local 
Development” to accum ulate the following revenue: 75 percent o f  user fees 
imposed according to regulations for the governorate “Account for Services 
and Local Development,” profits from agricultural cooperative societies, 
rents, and other returns to investments (Art. 70). Note that apart from the 
extra-budgetary funds, districts do not have locally generated revenues. The 
account is governed by the G overnor’s decree; Balances in those accounts 
roll over from one fiscal year to  another but are subject to the sam e financial 
management rules as the budgetary funds.
In addition to the extra-budgetary funds controlled by the local executive 
head, service directorates are also authorized to collect revenues for 
“service im provem ent” funds (HDR, 2005). For example, in rural clinics, 
uninsured patients have to pay EGP 3 plus one third of the m edicine costs.9 
Nominal fees are also charged for specialized services such as radiology, 
dentistry and small surgery.
In practice, the extra-budgetary accounts accumulate revenue from 
various user fees, adm inistrative charges and license fees. The schedule o f  
fees often includes charges on electricity bills, water m eter installation,
industrial licenses, vehicle and motorcycle licenses, and construction 
perm its (HDR, 2005). Besides approval by the LPCs, the schedule o f  fees 
has to be authorized by the Prim e Minister individually for each 
govem orate. As a result fees on com parable items vary widely across 
governorates sometim es by a factor o f  200 (El Shawi, 2007). One o f  the 
reasons is that, once introduced, the fees are not updated frequently. Thus, 
in Assuit Govem orate the schedule o f  fees for the Services and Local 
Development Fund has not been updated since it was first introduced in 
1983. At the same time, despite the difference in the tim e o f  decreeing, in
2000 and 2006 respectively, the governorates o f  Qena and Beheira have 
very similar fee schedules possibly due to  that fact that same person (Adel 
Ali Labib, presently governor o f  A lexandria) served as their governor in 
those respective tim es periods.
Local revenues from own sources and shared taxes account for less than 
a quarter o f  total local revenue with the rest made up by transfers. It should 
be noted that property taxes account for less than 10 percent o f subnational 
pre-transfer revenues. In Egypt, property is taxed through three separate tax 
instruments: Agricultural Land Tax, Building Tax, and Real Estate Transfer 
Tax. These taxes have rather low yield o f  0.2 percent o f  GDP out o f which
0.15 percent o f  GDP is accounted for by recurrent taxes (Agricultural Land 
Tax and Building Tax) and the rem aining 0.05 percent is accounted for by 
taxes on property transactions. This is well below the average for low- 
m iddle-income countries (0.42 percent) and the world average (0.75 
percent) according to  Bird and Slack (2004). Just like for other taxes, local 
authorities are passive recipients o f property tax revenue without playing 
any role in tax-setting or administration. Reportedly in Cairo tax arrears 
exceed tax collections by a ratio o f  6:1 (W orld Bank, 2006b). However, 
even if  Egypt succeeded in raising the revenue yield to the world average, 
the property tax could only cover 10 percent o f  expenditures o f  the 
executive head secretariats not including any sectoral expenditure. Motor 
vehicle fees have a yield com parable to that o f the building tax; however, 
m ore than two thirds o f  this revenue is collected in just three urban 
governorates— Cairo, Alexandria, and Giza (W orld Bank, 2006b).
According to Table 12.8, extra-budgetary revenue accounts for 30 -50  
percent o f subnational pre-transfer revenue. Extra-budgetary resources are 
mostly spent on material supplies (79 percent). Most o f  these resources are 
spent by subnational executive heads’ secretariat as opposed to service 
directorates (El Shawi, 2007). The amount and composition o f  ex tra­
budgetary revenues varies am ong localities. Thus in relatively affluent 
Behira govem orate, the bulk o f extra-budgetary resources comes from 
revenue-generating projects, such as car parking and vegetable and fruit 
projects. By contrast in the relatively poor govem orate o f  Assuit, projects
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Table 12.8 Pre-transfer Revenue o f  Subnational Government, million EGP
2004/2005
Actual
2005/2006
Budgeted
2006/2007
Budgeted
Sovereign Revenues
Local units share from commercial 
and industrial profits taxes
- 278.1 -
Local units share from revenue 
retention
269.4 - -
Local units share from the revenue 
pool
252.0 472.9 -
Local units share from Suez Canal 
revenue
147.0 393.6 -
Agricultural land tax 167.9 178.6 213.0
Building tax 159.2 147.4 188.0
Vehicle fees and tax 137.2 146.4 150.0
Gambling and entertainment tax 44.1 42.8 46.0
Local taxes and fees 70.7 80.7 87.0
Local units share from imports and 
exports taxes
- 204.8 -
Total sovereign revenues 1247.5 1945.3 684.0
Donations 2.5 208.0 196.0
Extra-budgetary funds 1703.7 1258.4 1338.0
Other current revenues 581.6 690.2 808.0
Total pre-transfer revenue 3535.3 4101.9 3026
Source: Mohamed El Shawi (2007).
Note: Sovereign revenues include local taxes and fees and local retention of some 
national taxes. The sharp drop in sovereign revenues in 2006/07 budgets compared 
to the FY 2005/06 figures is due to inability of local budgets to plan for some of the 
shared revenue. If these omitted revenue sources were added to the budget, the total 
sovereign revenue would increase to EGP 2.033 million. In FY 2005/06 revenue 
retention from profit taxes and import and export taxes are reported jointly.
contribute only one third o f  extra-budgetary revenue with the rest com ing 
from property transfer fee, construction permits, and housing rents.
The potential for m obilizing local resources for projects with tangible 
local benefits is dem onstrated by the national program for integrated rural
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development “Shorouk.” This initiative promotes dem and-driven projects 
with popular participation in terms o f  initiating, planning, financing, 
implementing and evaluating local development. Even in the relatively poor 
governorate o f  Assuit, local com m unities contributed more than a quarter o f 
the project costs (El Shawi, 2007).
Counter-equalizing Transfers
Technically we can identify transfers only with respect to the secretariat o f 
the local executive heads (Diwans). Service directorates have no own 
revenues and are essentially funded from the national budget pretty much 
the same way as their sectoral head-offices in Cairo. However, with respect 
to  capital projects, there are reports that the Ministry o f  Education has 
experimented with some kind o f lump-sum capital grants to education 
directorates without earmarking for any specific site or type o f  school. 
(W orld Bank, 2005b). However, in the 2006/07 budget, zero capital 
expenses were planned for education directorates (Table 12.3).
In the case o f  Diwans, we can examine two channels o f  
intergovernmental transfers. First, it is the distribution o f  funds accumulated 
from h alf o f  shared revenue from special surtaxes on imports/exports, 
investment security holdings, and income derived from trade or 
manufacturing. This pool o f  funds, referred to as the “Joint Revenue Fund” 
initially operated as an extra-budgetary fund controlled by the M inistry o f  
Local Development (Sawi, 2002). The M inistry o f  F inance would sign off 
on the distribution o f the “Joint Revenue Fund” as long as funded project 
proposals subm itted by local authorities had been approved by the Ministry 
o f  Planning (now the M inistry o f  Economic Developm ent) and included in 
the Plan. The distribution o f  this common pool is governed by a resolution 
o f  the M inister for Local Development.
In the early 2000s, the Joint Fund was distributed am ong governorates 
excluding Cairo and Alexandria according to a formula weighing in 
population, land area and need (W orld Bank, 2006b). Transfers from the 
“Joint Revenue Fund” account for less than 3 percent o f  the resources o f  the 
executive heads’ secretariats. Reportedly, recently governorates have started 
receiving capital grants from the M inistry o f  Economic Development 
(form erly M inistry o f  Planning) based on a formula weighing in population 
and HDIs. It is unclear whether this formula applies to the “Joint Revenue 
Fund.” Similarly, the revenue from the Suez Canal surtax is used to fund 
projects approved by the M inistry o f  Economic Development and 
distributed am ong the five governorates surrounding the Canal in the 
following proportion: 50 percent to Ismailia, 30 percent to Port Said and 
Suez, and 10 percent each to North and South Sinai. These revenues
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account for less than 20 percent o f  total resources o f  executive heads’ 
secretariats in those five governorates.
The second channel o f  transfers for the secretariat o f the local executive 
heads is essentially filling the gap between the budgeted current 
expenditures and the estim ated revenue from own sources and shared taxes. 
The gap-filling approach also applies to capital grants as reportedly the 
balance o f  extra-budgetary funds from the previous year is deducted by the 
M inistry o f  Finance before allocating financing for the approved local 
capital projects.
As can be seen in Table 12.9 the allocation o f intergovernmental 
revenue moderately improves disparities am ong governorates. Thus, the 
coefficient o f  variation in per capita expenditures on general public services 
by Diwans (0.83) is only slightly less than the coefficient o f  variation in per 
capita pre-transfer revenue (1.05). The coefficient o f  variation in per capita 
expenditures on healthcare services is 50 percent higher than o f  that for per 
capita pre-transfer revenue. Only for education is inequality in per capita 
expenditures significantly lower than for per capita pre-transfer revenue. 
This is not surprising given that per capita am ounts o f  own-source revenues 
are positively correlated with per capita amounts o f both recurrent and 
capital transfers, with correlation coefficients o f  0.18 and 0.74 respectively.
Borrowing
The existing legislation does not rule out subnational borrowing. Thus, Law 
43 o f  1979 (Art. 12 as am ended by Law 50 o f  1981) gives govem orate 
popular councils the power to borrow within the plan limits and authorized 
budget, provided that total indebtedness does not exceed 40 percent o f  their 
own revenue. The Law does not allow local governm ent units to assume 
debt or any other liabilities leading to future expenses other than those in 
connection with a project included in the plan or budget approved by the 
national parliament. The information on the actual level o f  indebtedness is 
not available but the am ount for subnational interest expenses budgeted in 
FY 2006/07 was under 3 percent o f  the budget o f  the executive heads’ 
secretariats.
Assessment: Ambiguity and Lack of Autonom y as A W ay of 
Conducting Business
Practically every aspect o f  intergovernm ental relations in Egypt seems to 
suffer from a lack o f  clarity and from general vagueness. And it is not only 
foreign observers who have difficulties getting a clear picture o f  how 
Egypt’s subnational system o f  finance really works. Often, the Government 
o f  Egypt itself appears to navigate its journey towards decentralization by
Table 12.9 Disparity in Subnational Revenue and Expenditures. FY 2003/04. EGP per capita
Governorate
Pre-transfer
revenues
Current
Transfers
Capital
Transfers
Secretariat
expenditures
Education
expenditures
Healthcare
expenditures
Red Sea 319 339 128 596 253 83
South Sinai 326 340 33 638 216 382
Suez 150 310 29 147 212 47
lsmailia 142 323 18 206 201 60
Giza 31 133 7 69 88 9
Port Said 188 554 37 345 354 202
Cairo 59 145 7 51 133 21
Luxor 61 398 11 238 207 133
Matrouh 83 337 46 351 185 746
Behera 63 236 18 124 142 6
Alexandria 46 224 44 107 159 9
Fayoum 34 211 11 126 121 88
Aswan 66 403 12 175 238 158
Menia 33 230 4 90 154 22
Damietta 49 431 11 158 262 71
North Sinai 125 786 20 386 446 422
Kalyoubia 30 216 3 73 136 25
Suhag 32 249 4 84 172 12
Beni Suef 37 254 11 104 143 56
Menoufia 37 332 17 97 195 32
Table 12.9 Disparity in Subnational Revenue and Expenditures. FY 2003/04. EGP per capita (continued)
Governorate
Pre-transfer
revenues
Current
Transfers
Capital
Transfers
Secretariat
expenditures
Education
expenditures
Healthcare
expenditures
El Wadi El Gidid 59 1.095 21 409 641 515
Kafr ElSheikh 29 276 14 95 158 58
Gharbia 33 342 10 105 194 8
Asyout 23 257 6 89 143 33
Qena 25 291 6 100 185 71
Shark ia 20 295 15 86 191 31
Dakahlia 26 360 9 112 225 21
Average 79 347 21 191 213 123
Minimum 20 133 3 51 88 6
Maximum 326 1.095 128 638 641 746
Coef. of Variati on 1.05 0.57 1.20 0.83 0.53 1.48
Source: Computed by authors based on data from 06/07 National Budget.and Mohamed El Shawi (2007).
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way o f  “touch and feel.” Currently, the information available in Egypt on 
the behavior o f  subnational governments would seem to be largely 
inadequate to inform policy m akers about the true situation regarding 
subnational fiscal accounts and the conditions o f  service delivery. This 
overall am biguity led some scholars to believe that there are, “in reality, no 
local governments in Egypt, only local outposts o f  the central government.” 
(Thirsk and M artinez-Vazquez, 2007). The all pervasive am biguity is likely 
to be the outcom e o f  an explicit policy design and has several main 
manifestations. The first source o f  am biguity is in the relationships and 
direction o f  accountability between a locally elected people’s council (LPC) 
and an appointed local executive council (LEC) operating at every 
subnational level o f  government. The LEC prepares and executes the local 
budget and is responsible for the quantity and quality o f  local public 
services that are provided. But their accountability is practically only to  the 
central governm ent hierarchy that em ploys them, as opposed to the elected 
councils they are supposed to serve. That is what happens in practice. 
Formally, the lines o f  accountability are not very clearly established in the 
law. Although higher level popular councils have supervisory authority over 
the lower-level popular councils, they have no authority over the executive 
branch at the sam e level (the LECs), especially since the abolishment o f  the 
interpellation clause in 1988.
Under the interpellation procedure, one third or more o f  council 
members could submit interpellation concerning the heads o f  local units, 
chairmen o f executive agencies, and public authorities working in the 
jurisdiction. The submission proceeded to  a permanent commission that had 
to  include representatives o f  the higher level popular and executive 
councils. The com m ittee had to report its findings to the council and if  two- 
thirds approved, the governor was informed and had to refer the matter to 
investigative authorities. However, the 1988 am endment eliminated this 
clause (Art. 106-BIS) from Law 43.
A second source o f am biguity is found in the relationships between the 
executive heads appointed by the higher-level executive and heads o f  the 
service directorates or departments in the local jurisdiction appointed by 
respective line ministries. Legally, the heads o f  the directorates are the 
budget holders for the respective sectoral funds in the governorates. Thus 
each o f the 12 service directorates within each o f  the 29 governorates 
technically has full control over the development and implementation of its 
budget and priorities within the overall guidelines set by the relevant 
ministry. But in practice, the governors may exercise considerable influence 
in the budget process through “discussions” with the heads o f  directorates 
although the extent o f  their involvement differs from govem orate to 
govemorate. The involvement o f the governor may depend on his political 
clout in the Prim e M inister’s Office and the Cabinet. Moreover, the budget
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negotiations between the Ministry o f  Finance and the govem orates do not 
always involve line ministries (although according to the Minister o f 
Finance, tripartite discussions will be held in the future). The information 
flows and decision lines are quite opaque, to the point that a recent report 
from the W orld Bank (2005b) suggests that line ministries m ay not know 
what budget requests have been put forward by their directorates.
A third source o f  am biguity arises from the unclear delineation o f 
functions between the levels o f  government. Specific local functions 
explicitly stated in the current Law o f  Local Administration o f  1979 appear 
random and are scattered all over the text. The law also assigns the same 
functions to other levels o f  governm ent. Saying that several governments 
are responsible m ay sim ply imply that nobody is responsible in particular. 
Thus, while the previous point suggests unclear delineation o f 
responsibilities between the national and subnational tiers, there is even less 
clarity in the delineation o f  responsibilities am ong the subnational tiers due 
to the continued use o f  the “m atroshka” model from the old Soviet 
budgeting system. In this system every subnational budget is nestled into 
the larger one o f  the upper-level governm ent creating a relationship o f 
vertical fiscal dependency and the ability to  “pass on the buck” upwards. 
A nother distinguishing feature o f  this “budget within a budget” system is 
the large degree o f  fiscal discretion it permits. Political and economic 
powers vested in upper-level governm ents give am ple opportunities to 
“reward one’s friends and punish one’s enemies” and clear-cut, objective 
rules for determ ining fiscal allocations are extremely difficult to discern and 
more fundamentally, they are unwanted. But unlike in the Soviet 
“m atroshka” system, in Egypt, the information passed to the higher level is 
even m ore aggregated.
Another source o f  opaqueness in budget flows, also inherited from the 
old Soviet-style budgeting system is the lack o f  an integrated approach 
between the recurrent and capital budgets. Thus, drafting o f  the 
“ investm ents” chapter o f  local budgets takes place com pletely outside the 
sectoral budgetary process and is entirely channeled through the Ministry o f 
Econom ic Development (form er M inistry o f  Planning) hierarchy and added 
to other economic item s in the budget only at the national level. This 
disconnect continues during the budget execution; while the sectoral 
directors are budget holders for sectoral recurrent expenditures, the 
governor is the budget holder for block grants for spending on investment 
projects, which are currently allocated by the M inistry o f  Economic 
Development to govem orates on the basis o f  a weighted index o f  population 
and the Human Developm ent Indicators. The break o f the natural linkages 
between capital and operational costs o f  local governm ent activities not 
unexpectedly leads to a whole spate o f  problems. Thus, in the health sector,
there appears to have been overbuilding o f hospitals and a failure to make 
full use o f  the existing stock o f  hospital beds, with the result that in some 
areas o f  Egypt there is an excessive number o f  hospital beds (W orld Bank, 
2005a). In the w ater sector, investment in new infrastructure appears to be a 
substitute for adequate preventive maintenance o f  the existing 
infrastructure. The disconnect between the capital and recurrent parts o f  
subnational spending is further aggravated by the lack o f  horizontal 
coordination am ong service directorates. This has led. for example, to 
situations where a newly built school is only partially used by students 
because the financing o f the complementary supporting infrastructure, such 
as roads, has been pushed back.
Another elem ent o f opaqueness in the budget process is the practice o f  
the extra-budgetary accounts (“Special Development Funds” ), which 
represent about 5 percent o f  subnational resources— comparable to the 
am ount o f  local revenue from all own and shared taxes put together. 
Conventionally the use o f extra-budgetary funds at the subnational level 
should be discouraged because they cause fragmentation o f budget 
allocation decisions and reduce the efficient use o f  resources (end users o f 
these funds typically do not have to compete with other potential users in 
the budget) and because they reduce transparency and accountability. 
However, in the case o f  Egypt, these special accounts provide the only 
means for local authorities to exercise discretion in the allocation o f 
resources according to local priorities. The lack o f  access to a broad-based 
source o f  revenue results in a plethora o f  fees earmarked for ex tra­
budgetary funds. In Assuit governorate, an extra-budgetary fund created in
2001 to accum ulate revenues for cleaning and beautification activities had a 
schedule o f  fees including 52 items (El Shawi, 2007).10
WHAT DOES THE FUTURE HOLD?
Since 2007 there have been serious discussions within and outside 
government over what shape and form fiscal decentralization reform should 
take in Egypt. This impetus has been reinforced by the support o f  the 
international com m unity in providing technical assistance for the 
formulation o f  the technical aspects o f  the reform ." After a series o f  high 
level conferences under the leadership o f  the M inistry o f  Local 
Development and the preparation o f  national decentralization paper for the 
NDP meeting in late 2007 (see Box 12.1), a lot o f  work has gone into 
drafting a national decentralization strategy and implementation plan. It 
appears that the Egyptian Government understands well the importance o f  
developing a well structured policy vision before m oving into concrete
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implementation steps. In particular, the idea o f  jum ping on the wagon o f  
amending the Local Administration Law in tim e for the past April 2008 
elections was squarely abandoned.
Despite the NDP w orking paper guidelines, not surprisingly, for the time 
being there does not seem to be clarity and agreement am ong government 
stakeholders regarding the main features o f  the new decentralized system. 
On the one hand, the leadership at the M inistry o f  Local Development 
working together with the M inistry o f  Finance is developing the elements 
outlined in the NDP working paper in a quite different direction from the 
one being developed by some line ministries, especially the M inistry o f  
Education.
In a thumbnail, the policy vision being developed by the M inistry o f  
Local Development and the M inistry o f  Finance is based on four basic 
points:
(i) M aking the district the basic unit o f decentralization at the local 
level, while the Governorate would become a more clearly defined 
deconcentrated territorial unit o f  the central government.
(ii) Em powering the district Popular Councils to make autonomous 
budget decisions on their own expenditure responsibilities or 
functions assigned to  them in an exclusive fashion by the law, and 
for delegated responsibilities assigned to the districts through the 
selected sectoral decentralization o f  responsibilities which were, 
until now, carried out exclusively by the central government.
(iii) Funding o f  the lion’s share o f  the expenditure needs o f  the district 
governm ents through block grants from the central government, 
although districts will be able to raise revenues through service fees 
and other current revenue sources assigned to them.
(iv) Etablishing Financial Com m issions at the national and governorate 
levels to oversee formula-based distribution o f  grants am ong 
govem orates and districts respectively.
The vision for decentralization o f  the M inistry o f  Education is quite 
different. Basically, the funds would flow directly from the M inistry to the 
school council bypassing entirely the district government and budgets. 
However, the discussion is limited to appropriations on material supplies, 
which currently account for less than 5 percent o f  education directorates’ 
budget. The ongoing discussions include the possibility o f  adopting similar 
approaches in other areas such as health.
It is too early to  say which view, if  any, will be carried forward. A lot 
will depend on how the Governm ent and the NDP view the political 
opportunities and perils o f  decentralization reform. As a sign o f  anticipation 
o f  the growing importance o f  local governm ents and the decentralization
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Box 12.1 NDP's roadmap fo r  decentralization
•  Empowerment o f  LPCs to activate their monitoring role o f the executive councils, and 
to establish local funds to mobilize local resources through authorized taxes and/or 
charges;
•  Devolution o f  authorities related to public service delivery to the local level. In that, 
the Governor would be the prime party responsible for planning and implementation 
o f  a package o f  wide-coverage services (e.g. plant and network services -  electricity, 
sanitation, water supply, roads, etc.). Each govemorate will have a budget that 
includes all allocations to deliver these services. Governorates would have the right to 
move resources across line items in light o f  legislated national standards and 
measures, with the endorsement o f  the LPCs;
•  Markazes, and cities will have their own separate budgets allocated from the 
respective govemorate. Markazes and cities are to use these budgets to plan and 
implement delivery o f  public services o f  local nature (e.g. schools, family health care 
units, cleansing systems, local networks o f  public works, etc.). Cities and Markazes 
will have the right to move resources across line items in light o f  legislated national 
standards and measures, with the endorsement o f  the respective LPCs;
•  Governorates are to be the units for socio-economic development. They are to issue a 
local development program based on programs developed by cities and markazes o f 
the govemorate. The national development program is to be based on these 
governorates’ programs. The local program (govemorate, city, marakaz) should serve 
as the basis for budgeting and expenditures for public service;
• Sectoral ministries (e.g. education, health, etc.) are to develop and issue national 
strategies including sectoral policies and national standards o f  respective service 
delivery. The respective quality assurance agency in each sector is to monitor 
compliance o f  these standards at the local level. National ministries are to issue annual 
reports including national averages o f  indicators o f  public service delivery, along with 
information disaggregated at the govemorate level. These indicators will be used to 
direct public resources to governorates with the highest levels o f  needs to achieve 
equity;
•  The national government will update the budgeting process to reflect new roles of 
local authorities in the national expenditures. The government is to issue financial 
standards that are to be applied in localities in budgeting and financial reporting 
presented to the central level. Formulaes to be used to distribute resources among 
governorates are to be announced;
•  Developing the financial and administrative framework that enables establishment o f  
local financial committees at the govemorate level comprising the Governor, 
Chairperson o f  the LPC, a representative o f  the Ministry o f  Finance, a representative 
o f  the Ministry o f  Local Development. The committee will distribute financial 
allocations o f  public services o f  local nature (see above) among marakezes and cities 
within that govemorate to achieve equity among local units;
•  The Ministry o f  Local Development (M oLD) is the governmental body responsible for 
decentralization. It is responsible for coordination among central entities to activate 
decentralization. The MoLD is also responsible for the performance o f  senior 
executives at local levels. It will publish reports about performance levels o f  
governorates in devolved responsibilities. It will support local units in developing 
their capacity to undertake new mandates.
Source: NDP (2007)
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reforms to come, the 2008 local elections saw unusually high competition to 
enter the electoral races. In the previous elections only 1.2 candidates 
competed for each seat with 60 percent o f  seats taken by unopposed 
candidates from the National Democratic Party. In 2008, the Muslim 
Brotherhood put forward roughly 5,000 activists to com pete for some 
52,000 seats at the different levels o f  local elections o f  which only 500 were 
able to  register. M eanwhile, opposition parties put forward some 4,000 
candidates (1,700 from the liberal al-W afd, 600 from the leftist Tagam m u’, 
and 700 from the liberal al-Ghad), o f whom only 1,200 successfully 
registered (Herzallah and Hamzawy, 2008). There was also fierce 
com petition among NDP m em bers to be nominated as a party candidate 
with 600 NDP members quitting the party in protest o f  not getting a 
nomination. However, there was not as much competition at the ballot as it 
was during the registration process. At the end the M uslim Brotherhood 
decided to boycott the elections and voter turnout did not exceed 5 percent. 
Over 80 percent o f  the 52,000 local council seats were won by NDP 
candidates running unopposed and overall 95 percent o f  seats went to NDP.
CONCLUSIONS AND THE W AY FORWARD
There are reasons to be m oderately optim istic about the prospects for fiscal 
decentralization reform even if  the obstacles remain formidable. The 2007 
Constitutional am endm ents gave the national legislature some control over 
the President-appointed Cabinet (confirmation vote, vote o f  confidence, 
etc.). In particular, the national legislature got the right to am end the budget 
put forward by the government. This is in line with the proposed 
em powering o f LPCs vis-a-vis LECs at the local level (NDP, 2007). 
M oreover, the 2007 constitutional am endm ents added the following clause 
to Article 161: “The law  shall guarantee the endorsement o f  decentralization 
and regulate the m eans by which the adm inistrative units can provide and 
upgrade local facilities and services, improve them and provide good 
m anagem ent.”
On the other hand, the history o f  Egypt has already seen local 
governm ent reform initiatives, including legal and constitutional 
am endm ents, which have failed to materialize. Thus, Article 162 o f  the 
1971 Constitution provided for “gradual transfer o f  authority to the Local 
Popular Councils.” However, 35 years down the road elected local councils 
are still fairly powerless vis-a-vis the executives and in fact have lost some 
o f  the few powers that they used to have, such as the interpellation power. 
The lines o f  horizontal accountability are still not established in the law 
very clearly. Since the abolishm ent o f  the interpellation clause in 1988,
popular councils have supervisory authority over lower-level popular 
councils but no authority over their own executive branch.
The successful implementation o f  the decentralization reforms this time 
will depend on fleshing out some o f the main elements:
1. Identification o f  the expenditure responsibilities o f  the district 
government, including both own or exclusive responsibilities and 
delegated responsibilities from the central governm ents (through 
sectoral decentralization).
2. Quantification o f  the expenditure needs that arise from the 
expenditure assignments to the district governments.
3. Identification o f  the financial instruments for the transfer o f  funds to 
be implemented by the M inistry o f  Finance: Determining the use o f  
funds in the district government budget (i.e., general funding at the 
discretion o f  the local government versus conditional funding where 
the local government can only use those funds with the conditions 
attached by the central government.)
4. The process o f  the distribution o f funds through the Grants 
Com mission at the central level and the Local Finance Commission 
at the governorate level.
In what follows we discuss in more detail how to carry out each o f  these 
tasks, pointing out some options when pertinent.
Identification o f  the expenditure responsibilities o f  the district 
government. These responsibilities will need to be identified in the law. At 
the present time, it is foreseen that the “own” or “exclusive” expenditure 
responsibilities o f  district governments will include street lighting, refuse 
collection, and local/city roads. It m ay also be advisable to recognize as an 
“own” expenditure responsibility the administration costs the district 
governm ent is expected to reasonably incur. For delegated expenditure 
responsibilities, the prime candidate currently is education services. Given 
all the political concerns, asymmetrical assignment may be the way to go. 
The Local Administration law allows a separate statute for “special cities” 
and Luxor City has such a statute. It appears that newly 
reclaim ed/established urban settlements are governed by a special system 
with a board o f  trustees representing the local business community, 
households, labor and consumers (Sawi, 2002).
Quantification o f  the expenditure needs that arise fro m  the expenditure 
assignments to  the district governments. This will be the most delicate and 
important task in the decentralization reforms. The expenditure needs for 
own responsibilities should be com puted separately from the expenditure 
needs for delegated responsibilities. At some point in the future it may be 
also desirable to separately estim ate the expenditure needs for the various
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own responsibilities, but that does not seem to be necessary at the present 
tim e (given the anticipated expenditure assignments). It is important that the 
criteria used to estim ate expenditure needs (either own or delegated 
responsibilities) are reflective o f  the population needs themselves as 
opposed to  the existing capacity at the district level to provide the services. 
For exam ple, a funding mechanism for education services based on the 
num ber o f  children o f  school age is focused on need while a funding 
mechanism based on the num ber o f  classrooms available in the district 
would be based on existing capacity. Obviously, this second approach 
would send wrong incentives (build additional classrooms without end) and 
it would be much less equitable or fair.
The sim plest approach to  the determination o f  expenditure needs for 
own functions or responsibilities is on a “per capita basis” or on a “per 
capita basis adjusted upwards for the relative number o f  families living in 
poverty in the district.” In the case o f  delegated responsibilities a similar 
approach should be followed. Since the only delegated responsibility in the 
first phase o f  decentralization will be basic education, the sim plest rule 
would be to use a transfer formula either based simply on the “number o f 
children o f  school age in the district" or the “number o f  children o f  school 
age in the district adjusted for cost differentials across districts.” Whether or 
not this second approach is desirable will depend on the existence or not o f  
noticeable differences in costs in different areas o f  the country in the 
delivery o f  a standard package o f  education services.
Identification o f  the financial instruments fo r  the transfer o f  funds to he 
implemented by the Ministry o f  Finance. Transfers can take many forms in 
regards to the use o f  funds allowed to the recipient subnational government. 
Given the nature o f  the assignm ent o f  responsibilities for “own functions” 
and “delegated functions” and also considering the importance o f  promoting 
autonom y and accountability at the local level, it would be desirable to 
organize the transfers for own expenditure responsibilities as unconditional 
grants and the transfers for education expenditure responsibilities as block 
grants. (However, a valid case could be made in favor o f  using conditional 
specific grants, at least initially, in the case o f  transfers for education.)
The process o f  the distribution offunds through the Grants Commission 
at the central level and the Local Finance Commission at the governorate 
level. The current strategic vision for decentralization considers the 
introduction o f a National Grants Com mission at the central level. It would 
be the role o f  the Com mission to consider the pluses and minuses o f  
different formulas and approaches, including the ones suggested here. The 
Com mission would need to work with external technical support or rely on 
the technical expertise of, for exam ple, the newly created Technical Office 
o f  the M inistry for Local Development. It is important to be aware that both
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the National Grants Commission and the also the proposed Local Finance 
Com missions at the govem orate level must avoid working on a 
discretionary basis, using hidden criteria, and so on. Instead these two 
bodies must follow explicit and transparent formulas. But, for example, 
there may be som e decisions local finance commissions may make at the 
govem orate level by selecting values for some o f the parameters in the 
formulas.
NOTES
1. This budgeting system was largely introduced to Egypt during its alignment with the Soviet 
Union in the 1960s, which continued until Nasser’s death in 1970.
2. Thus, the World Bank Public Expenditure Review  finds that "the poor allocation o f 
resources and the lack o f  a strategic approach to quality improvement are contributing to the 
loss o f patient satisfaction with the public health services. As a result, most Egyptians, 
including those living in the poorest regions, are more often seeking health services from the 
private sector." (World Bank 2006, pp. 17-8)
3. A 2001 study by the General Authority on investment and Free Zonez (GAFI) found that a 
new investment could involve as many as 22 ministries and 78 government agencies.
4. About 30 percent o f  healthcare is covered directly from the budget, another 10 percent 
through the social insurance scheme: while the private insurance accounts for less than one 
percent o f  total healthcare costs.
5. For example, on April 16, 2008, President Mubarak stated that Egypt’s “approach towards 
decentralization is irreversible" and that "it has become an indivisible part of the 
Constitution.” (Egypt State Information Service website).
6. The contents o f the NDP decentralization vision are discussed below in the chapter.
7. The main laws are: law 57 of 1971, law 52 o f 1975 and the (current) law 43 of 1979. 
Furthermore, the last law has been amended several times by law 50 of 1981, law 186 of 
1981, law 26 o f  1982, law 106 o f 1987, law 145 o f  1988, law 9 o f 1989, and law 84 o f  1996.
8. While LPCs formally approve drafts o f  the budget and final accounts before it is submitted 
to the Ministry o f Finance, it is the latter who conducts negotiations with governors and 
approves the final versions.
9. USD$1= 5.7 Egyptian Pounds (EGP).
10. Recently, these resources have been forced into the national Treasury system to generate 
information and control o f  the funds. This move, which in theory should not reduce the 
autonomy o f  local authorities in deciding the final use o f the funds, has been bitterly 
opposed at the subnational level and it has been interpreted by many as a clear indication o f  
the re-centralization designs o f  the central authorities.
11. The international support effort has been lead by USAID but also with participation of the 
UNDP, the World Bank and some other bilateral donors.
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